Autonocoin: A Proof-of-Belief Cryptocurrency

Michael Abramowicz

Abstract


This paper proposes a self-governing cryptocurrency, dubbed Autonocoin. Cryptocurrency owners play formal tacit coordination games by making investments recorded on the blockchain. Such investments represent bets about the focal point resolution of normative issues, such as whether a proposed change to Autonocoin should occur. The game produces a result that resolves the issue. With a typical cryptocurrency, the client software establishes conventions that ultimately lead to the identification of the authoritative blockchain. Autonocoin completes a circle by making transactions on the blockchain that in turn define those conventions and the expected software behavior. The distributed consensus mechanism embodied by formal tacit coordination games, meanwhile, can make other types of decisions, including which of competing blockchains is authoritative and whether new Autonocoins should be rewarded to benefit those who have taken actions to benefit Autonocoin. This establishes a unique funding model for a cryptocurrency, and it addresses objections to cryptocurrencies issued predominantly to the initial founders, as well as to those that encourage wasteful mining activities.


Keywords


Cryptocurrency; Autonocoin; Bitcoin; Tacit coordination; Focal point; Schelling point

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5195/ledger.2016.37

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